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Abstract
Considering the attacks against industrial control system
are mostly organized and premeditated actions, IP trace-
back is significant for the security of industrial control
system. Based on the infrastructure of the Internet, we
have developed a novel malicious IP traceback model-
ICSTrace, without deploying any new services. The
model extracts the function codes and their parameters
from the attack data according to the format of industrial
control protocol, and employs a short sequence proba-
bility method to transform the function codes and their
parameter into a vector, which characterizes the attack
pattern of malicious IP addresses. Furthermore, a Partial
Seeded K-Means algorithm is proposed for the pattern’s
clustering, which helps in tracing the attacks back to an
organization. ICSTrace is evaluated basing on the at-
tack data captured by the large-scale deployed honeypots
for industrial control system, and the results demonstrate
that ICSTrace is effective on malicious IP traceback in
industrial control system.
1 Introduction
With the rapid development of the Internet of Things
(IoT), more and more Industrial Control Systems (ICS)
are connected into the Internet. As the key bond between
the virtual signal and the real equipment, an Internet-
connected ICS makes the production process to be more
accurate and agile. But it also narrows the distance be-
tween the cyber attacks and the industrial infrastructure.
As we know, Stuxnet worm was disclosed to be the
first worm attacking the energy infrastructure [11, 23]
in 2010. In 2014 the hackers attacked a steel plant in
Germany, so that the blast furnace can not be closed
properly [41]. On December 23, 2015, the Ukrainian
power network suffered a hacker attack, which was the
first successful attack to the power grid, resulting in
hundreds of thousands of users suffering power black-
out for hours [42]. In 2017, the security vendor ESET
disclosed an industrial control network attack weapons
named as win32/Industroyer, which implemented mali-
cious attacks on power substation system [3].
ICSs are highly interconnected and interdependent
with the critical national infrastructure [34], and thus
the attackers have noticed the high returns to attack ICS
in recent years. The attackers are diverse in identity.
They may be hackers, members of organized criminal
groups, or even a hostile country. The worse situation is
that ICS has become the new target of terrorists to gain
the influence by destroying the real physical world. As
traditional ICS is physically isolated from the Internet,
most researches just focus on the functional safety of the
system rather than the security consideration of the net-
work. There are not any special protective measures, not
to mention the attribution mechanism for tracing the at-
tack back [22]. Security researchers are now commit-
ted to the intrusion detection technology for ICS. They
want to identify, intercept and alert the threats, before
a severe attack occurs. These intrusion detection tech-
nologies can be divided into several categories as fol-
lows: state-based [21], behavior-based [24], rule-based
[39], characteristic-based [25], model-based [26], and
ML-based (machine learning) [31, 43].
Because ICS plays an important role in the critical na-
tional infrastructure, the cyber attacks against ICS are
mostly organized and premeditated actions. It is signif-
icant not only to determine whether there is a threat in
ICS, but also to trace the attack back. Furthermore, lo-
cating the initiators and their motivations before or dur-
ing an attack is crucial for deterring and cracking down
the premeditated and organized attackers.
Attribution is one of the most intractable problems
of an emerging field, created by the underlying tech-
nical architecture and geography of the Internet [28].
The current dominant IP traceback technologies include
packet marking mechanism [30], packet logging mech-
anism [32] and their hybrid [15, 16]. Packet marking
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mechanism needs the routers to write a tag (for exam-
ple, IP address) into some fields of every packet. The
target retrieves all the tags from the received packets and
finds out the routing path. Packet marking mechanism
includes two categories: Probabilistic Packet Marking
(PPM) [30] and Deterministic Packet Marking (DPM)
[8]. Packet logging mechanism needs the routers to
record all the forwarded packets so as to reveal the rout-
ing path. Apparently, this mechanism consumes a lot of
storage space. All these IP traceback technologies above
need to re-design the Internet or to deploy new services.
There is still no applicable IP traceback system to deploy
over the network.
The ultimate goal of attribution is identifying an orga-
nization or a government, not individuals [28]. Our study
identifies an organization by zooming down to a single IP
level and then zooming back out to an organization or a
unit level without changing the Internet architecture or
deploying new services. Instead of tracing back to the
source of a packet directly, we just recognize the mali-
cious IP addresses which belong to the same organiza-
tion.
In this study, we present a malicious IP traceback
model (ICSTrace) for industrial control system, and this
model makes the following contributions:
1. Based on the deep analysis of ICS protocol
S7comm, the function codes and their parameters
are extracted from the attack data.
2. A feature vector of the function codes and their pa-
rameters are designed to represent the attack pat-
terns.
3. The slide window method is adopted to reduce the
dimension of those multidimensional samples.
4. A Partial Seeded K-Means clustering algorithm is
proposed based on K-Means algorithm.
5. ICSTrace is proven to be effective basing on the
real attack data captured by the large-scale deployed
honeypots for ICS.
Section 2 introduces the research background and our
previous work on the attack data collection. Section 3
gives the details of S7comm protocol. Section 4 de-
scribes the architecture of our IP traceback model. Sec-
tion 5 and Section 6 introduce the attack pattern extrac-
tion method and Partial Seeded K-Means algorithm for
clustering respectively. In Section 7, we evaluate our IP
traceback model basing on the real attack data. Section
8 is our related works and Section 9 is the conclusion.
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Figure 1: Structure of ICS Honeypot (S7commTrace).
2 Background
ICS is a business process management and control sys-
tem which is composed of various automatic control and
process control components. It collects and monitors re-
altime signals to ensure the function of the automatic op-
eration or the process control. Its application fields in-
clude program automation, industrial control, intelligent
building, power transmission and distribution, smart me-
ter, car communication and so on. ICS protocol refers to
the communication protocol used in ICS. The most well-
known ICS protocol includes S7, Modbus, BACnet, and
DNP3.
At present, there is not any ICS attacking data set for
security research. Therefore, we developed a high inter-
active ICS honeypot named as S7commTrace in previous
work [37], based on Siemens’ S7comm protocol. Honey-
pot is a kind of security resource that is used to attract the
attacker for illegal application without any business util-
ity [20]. Honeypot technology is a method to set some
hosts, network services or information as a bait, to in-
duce attackers, so that the behavior of the attacks can be
captured and analyzed [33]. Honeypot can be used to
better understand the landscape of where these attacks
are originating [44].
S7commTrace masquerades as a real PLC device by
simulating the S7 protocol to capture the probing and at-
tacking data. It can be divided into four modules, in-
cluding TCP Communication module, S7comm Protocol
Simulation module, Data Storage module and User Tem-
plate, as shown in Figure 1.
The main function of TCP Communication module is
to listen on TCP port 102, submit the received data to
the Protocol Simulation module, and reply to the remote
peer. S7comm Protocol Simulation module parses the
received data according to the protocol format and ob-
tains the valid contents at first. And then S7comm Proto-
col Simulation module generates the reply data referring
to User Template. At last, the reply data are sent back
to TCP Communication module to be packaged. User
Template records all the user-defined information such as
PLC serial number, manufacturer, and so on. The Data
Storage module handles the request and the response of
data storage.
2
Item Count
Request 110501
Valid request 46492
Session 5797
Valid session 4224
IP address 897
Valid IP address 573
Table 1: After 13 honeypots run for 272 days, count of
all attack data and valid attack data.
Domain Organization IP number
Shodan.io Shodan 26
eecs.umich.edu Censys 19
neu.edu.cn Ditecting 16
plcscan.org Beacon Lab 5
Other Unknown 507
Table 2: IP statics by DNS reverse lookup.
We deployed S7commTrace honeypots in United
States, China, Germany, Russia, Japan, Singapore and
Korea at the same time. The deployment utilize Aliyun
and Host1Plus as virtual host with configuration of 1.5
Ghz single core CPU, 1GB RAM and 40GB Disk. All
the operation systems of virtual hosts are Ubuntu Server.
Every virtual host installs MySQL database to store data
captured by S7commTrace.
Each S7commTrace ran for 272 days in average. At
last, we captured 110501 requests of S7comm proto-
col, as shown in Table 1. In fact, not all requests are
in accordance with S7comm format. Ignoring them,
S7commTrace records a total of 46492 valid requests. If
we define an uninterrupted TCP communication connec-
tion as a session, S7commTrace records 5797 sessions
and 4224 valid sessions. Furthermore, a valid IP address
indicates that this IP has at least one valid session.
According to the DNS query results, we find that
there are 26 IP addresses pointing to Shodan.io, 19 IP
addresses pointing to eecs.umich.edu, 16 IP addresses
pointing to neu.edu.cn, and 5 IP addresses pointing to
plcscan.org, as shown in Table 2. This means 573 valid
IP addresses belong to four organizations at least.
Shodan.io [6] is the domain suffix of Shodan which
is a search engine in cyberspace. In addition to retriev-
ing traditional web services, Shodan has used the ICS
protocol directly to crawl the ICS devices on the Inter-
net, and visualizes their location and other information.
Eecs.umich.edu is the domain suffix of the Department
of Electrical and Computer Science (EECS) Department
of University of Michigan, which is one of the agencies
developing Censys [1, 13]. Censys scans the devices in
IP
header
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header
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header
S7 data
Figure 2: Header format of S7 communication packet.
COTP Request
COTP ACK
S7 communication setup
S7 communication setup ACK
S7 functioncode request
S7 functioncode response
Host computer Machine
Figure 3: Communication procedure of S7 protocol.
the Internet and stores the results in its database. It pro-
vides not only web and API query interfaces but also
raw data to download. Neu.edu.cn is the domain suf-
fix of Northeastern University of China which develops
a search engine name as Ditecting [2]. Ditecting is capa-
ble of providing accurate information of ICS devices and
their locations. Plcscan.org is the domain suffix of Bea-
con Lab [4] which is committed to the research and the
practice related to ICS security. These four organizations
are the well-known security research institutes. They are
scanning the devices in the Internet all the time, includ-
ing the ICS devices. As shown in Table 2, except for the
66 IP addresses belonging to four well-known organiza-
tions, there are still 507 IP addresses which are resolved
to be dynamic domain name or none domain name.
3 S7 Protocol
S7 protocol is a Siemens proprietary protocol [5] running
on programmable logic controllers (PLCs) of Siemens
S7-200, 300, and 400series. It is suitable for either Eth-
ernet, PROFIBUS or MPI networks . Because the objects
of this study are those industrial control systems which
are accessed to the Internet, we only discuss the TCP-
based S7 protocol in Ethernet networks. As shown in
Figure 2, S7 protocol packets are packed by COTP pro-
tocol, and then packed by TPKT protocol package for
TCP connection.
As shown in Figure 3, the communication procedure
of S7 protocol is divided into three stages. The first stage
is to establish COTP connection, the second stage is to
setup S7 communication, and the third stage is to ex-
change the request and the response for function code.
The Magic flag of the S7 protocol is fixed to 0x32, and
3
Code Function
0x00 System Functions
0x04 Read
0x05 Write
0x1a Request Download
0x1b Download Block
0x1c Download End
0x1d Download Start
0x1e Upload
0x1f Upload End
0x28 PLC Control
0x29 PLC Stop
0xf0 Communication Setup
Table 3: S7 protocol function code and the corresponding
function.
the following fields are S7 type, data unit ref, parameters
length, data length, result info, parameters and data, as
shown in Figure 4.
In parameters field, the first byte stands for the func-
tion code of S7. Table 3 shows the optional function
codes of S7. Communication Setup code is used to build
a S7 connection; Read code helps the host computer to
read data from PLC; Write code helps the host computer
to write data to PLC.As for the codes of Request Down-
load, Download Block, Download End, Download Start,
Upload and Upload End, they are designed for down-
loading or uploading operations of blocks. PLC Control
code covers the operations of Hot Run and Cool Run,
while PLC Stop is used to turn off the device.
When the function code is 0x00, it stands for system
function which is used to check system settings or status.
And the details are described by the 4 bits function group
code and 1 byte subfunciton code in the parameters field,
as shown in Figure 5.
System Functions further divided into 7 groups, as
shown in Table 4. Block function is used to read the
block, and Time Function is used to check or set the de-
vice clock.
4 Structure of ICSTrace Model
When an attacker launches the attacks, he usually hides
the IP address of his own resorting to the springboard
host, VPN and other measures. As shown in Figure 6, af-
ter an ICS suffered an attack from the Internet, the secu-
rity personnel can only see the last IP address connected
to ICS instead of the real IP address of the attacker, not
to mention the organization which belongs to.
ICSTrace transforms the features of data from each IP
address into a one-dimensional eigenvector. This eigen-
vector stands for the unique pattern of an attack. There-
fore, the problem of attribution turns into a problem of
clustering the patterns.
As shown in Figure 7, the input of ICSTrace is a mali-
cious IP and its packets. The output is a cluster contain-
ing multiple IP addresses, which indicates an organiza-
tion. ICSTrace model consists of three stages, including
Protocol Resolution, Attack Pattern Extraction and Par-
tial Seeded K-Means clustering. The main function of
Protocol Resolution is to parse the packets and extract the
function codes and their parameters. Attack Pattern Ex-
traction transforms the function codes and their parame-
ters into one-dimensional vector as the attack pattern of a
certain IP address. Partial Seeded Means is used to clus-
ter the attack patterns so that those IP addresses with the
same patterns are aggregated into one cluster. And then,
the cluster is labeled as a certain organization according
to some auxiliary information (e.g. domain name or ge-
ographical location)of the IP addresses in it.
5 Attack Pattern Extraction
After an attacker has constructed the connection with
ICS, he will carry out a series of delicate operations on
purpose, which are expressed by the function codes and
their parameters in table 3 and table 4. Therefore, the
attacking features, which are extracted from the function
codes and their parameters of S7comm protocol data, can
reveal the intention of the attacker effectively.
As shown in Figure 8, one attacker may have several
IP addresses to launch attacks. We have defined an un-
interrupted TCP communication as a session, and one
IP address may attack one or more ICSs for more than
one times. And thus a single source IP may build sev-
eral sessions. We call a packet sent by the attacker as
a request and there are several packet interactions, so a
session usually contains many requests.
The function codes and their parameters of S7comm
protocol are included in these requests, so we extract
these from the communication data package, which is
sent by the attacker to the receiver, as the feature of the
attacker to construct IP traceback model.
5.1 Mean Count of Function Codes and
Parameters
Mean count of function codes (MCFC) refers to the av-
erage amount of the function codes of each session from
the same IP address. Different attackers have different
motivations, objectives and methods while conducting a
cyber attack. As a result, quantities of requests and func-
tion codes are very different in different sessions.
MCFC =
1
n
n
∑
i=1
(Count o f f unciton codes)sessioni ,
4
1 byte 1 byte 2 bytes 2 bytes 2 bytes 2 bytes 2 bytes m bytes n bytes
Magic
S7 type
Reserved
Data Unit Ref
Param length
Data length Parameters
Result info(optional) Data
Figure 4: Data format of S7 communication packet.
Function group code Function Subfunction code Subfunction
1 Programmer Commands 1 Request diag data2 VarTab
2 Cyclic Data 1 Memory
3 Block Function
1 List blocks
2 List blocks of type
3 Get block info
4 CPU Function 1 Read SZL2 Message service
5 Security 1 PLC password
6 PBC BSEND/BRECV None None
7 Time Function
1 Read clock
2,3 Set clock
4 Read clock (following)
Table 4: When the function code is 0x00, it is system function and further divided into 7 groups.
1 byte 3 bytes
Function code 0x00
4 bits 4 bits 1 byte n bytes
Subfuncion
Function group
Figure 5: When functioncode is 0x00, function group
and subfunction position.
sessioni ∈ IP
Mean count of the parameters (MCP) refers to the
average amount of the parameters used in the function
codes of each session from the same IP address. Some
function codes do not need parameters, some function
codes need one or more parameters, so different attack-
ers use different amount of parameters.
MCP =
1
n
n
∑
i=1
(Count o f parameters)sessioni ,
sessioni ∈ IP
ICS 1
ICS 2
ICS M
…
…
…
IP 1-2
IP 1-n1
IP 2-1
IP 2-2
IP 2-n2
IP N-1
IP N-2
IP N-n
IP 1-1
Figure 6: Schematic diagram of attacking flow.
5.2 Function Codes Sequence and Param-
eters Sequence
the change rule of the function codes Function codes se-
quence (FCS) indicates the change rule of the function
codes in all sessions from a single IP address. Differ-
ent attackers may use the same kind of function codes
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IP 1
IP 2
IP 3
IP 2
IP 1
IP 4
IP N
Attack organization 1
Attack Organization 2
Attack Organization X
...
...
Homology Detection Model
Attack PAttern 
Extraction
Partial Seeded 
K-Means
Protocol 
Resolution
Figure 7: Structure of ICS model.
IP 1 IP 2 IP M
…
Attacker
Session 1 Session 2
Request 1 Request 2
…
…
Session 1 Session 2
…
ICS 1 ICS 2
Figure 8: Schematic diagram of attack-IP-session-
request.
while lunching an attack, but the chronological order
is different. As shown in figure 9, the Function code
C1, C2, ..., Ci can be arrayed to form a Markov chain in
chronological order.
Array the function codes in the session to form a func-
tion code sequence according to the chronological order.
Fsessioni = (C1,C2, ...,Ci),sessioni ∈ IP
For some sessions may belong to the same source IP
address, we combine the function codes serials and pa-
rameter serials of all sessions from the same IP address
into a set of function code sequence.
Fn =

Fsession1
Fsession2
...
Fsessionn
=

C1 C2 ... Ca1
C1 C2 ... Ca2
...
C1 C2 ... Can
 ,
…C 1 C 2 C 3 C i-1 C i
Figure 9: Function codes sequence.
sessioni ∈ IP,1≤ i≤ n
Different amount of sessions originate from each
source IP and various methods are adopted by the attack-
ers for each time, which results in the different function
code sequences in each session. Therefore, Fn of differ-
ent source IP addresses are two-dimensional matrix vec-
tors with unequal rows and columns.
These FCSs with uncertain amount and unequal length
cannot be handled directly, for clustering algorithms like
K-Means needs samples with same dimensions. In this
study, we propose a method to convert these sequences
with uncertain amount and unequal length into the vec-
tors with same length, the detailed process is as follows:
Step 1 Add the start and the end status to the sequence.
For a sample set of sequence Fn, there are n se-
quences with unequal length and the length of which are
a1,a2, ...,an, ai ≥ 1, i ∈ [1,n] respectively. Add the start
and the end status to each sequence in Fn, then we get
Fn′. Now the length of each sequence is no less than 3.
Fn′ =

S C1 C2 ... Ca1 E
S C1 C2 ... Ca2 E
S ... E
S C1 C2 ... Can E

Step 2 Get the unrepeatable set of short sequences.
Setting the window length equals 3 and the stride
equals 1, we use the slide window method to process
each sequence in Fn′. Then we get a1,a2, ...,an short
sequences with the same length of 3, ai ≥ 1, i ∈ [1,n].
Then remove the duplicate sequences and add the short
sequences into set S = (s1,s2, ...,sm),m≤ ∑ni=1 ai.
Step3 Get the short sequences set of all sample sets.
Process all of the sequence sample sets according
to step1 and step2, and get a short sequence set S =
(s1,s2, ...,sk) without duplication.
Step4 Express the probability vector of the sequences
with uncertain amount and unequal length.
Pn =

C1 C2 ... Cb1
C1 C2 ... Cb2
...
C1 C2 ... Cbl

Pn′ =

S C1 C2 ... Cb1 E
S C1 C2 ... Cb2 E
S ... E
S C1 C2 ... Cbl E

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…C 1 C 2 C 3
…C 1 C 2 C 3
…C 1 C 2 C 3
…C 1 C 2 C 3
…C 1 C 2 C 3
…C 1 C 2 C 3
S
S
S
E
E
E
…C 1 C 2 C 3 C i
…C 1 C 2 C 3 C i
…C 1 C 2 C 3 C i
S
S
S
E
E
E
Ca1
Ca2
Can
Ca1
Ca2
Can
S =   s1, s2, … , sm , m ≤ ai
n
1
 
Xip =  xs1 , xs2 ,… , xsk  , xsi = 1
k
1
…C 1 C 2 C 3 C i
…C 1 C 2 C 3 C i
…C 1 C 2 C 3 C i
S
S
S
E
E
E
s1 s2 
s1 s2 
All IPs
Single IP
According to the 
probability of short 
sequence 
Figure 10: Method for FCS feature vector processing.
For a sequence set Pn corresponding to a certain IP,
there are l function code sequences with unequal length
and the lengths of them are b1,b2, ...,bl ,bi ≥ 1, i ∈ [1, l].
By adding the start and the end status to each sequences,
we get Pn′. And then we process all the function codes
sequences with the slide window method to construct a
feature vector Xip according to the frequency of these
short sequences.
Xip = (Xs1 ,Xs2 , ...,Xsk),
k
∑
i=1
Xsi = 1
The method for FCS feature vector processing is shown
in figure 10. We make an improvement on the short se-
quence processing method in literature [13]. The im-
proved method has the following advantages: Firstly, we
transform the FCS with uncertain amount and unequal
length from the same IP into feature vectors with the
same length, and we retain the information of the func-
tion codes and their parameters resorting to the frequency
characteristics of the short sequence. Secondly, when the
length of the short sequence is set to 3, we can process
the sequences with unequal length including the length
of 1 or 2, by adding the start and the end status.
Parameters sequence (PS) indicates the change rule
of the parameters in all the function codes used by
the sessions from the same IP and it is arrayed by
chronological order. Similar to FCS, we use the same
method to process PS.
indicates the rule of how the parameters vary in all the
function codes used by the sessions from the same IP
and it is also arrayed by chronological order. Similar to
FCS, we use the same method to process PS.
6 Partial Seeded K-Means Algorithm
We have tried machine learning methods for malicious
IP traceback. Commonly used machine learning meth-
ods include decision tree, SVM and neural network, but
all these methods need supervised training samples. But
in the homology test of attacking data, the attack source
is unknown and therefore the sample data has no labels.
Unsupervised learning can reveal the inherent nature and
law of data by learning the unlabeled training samples.
Clustering is the most widely used method in unsuper-
vised learning. Clustering is to divide the data samples
into multiple classes or clusters, so that the samples in
the same cluster have a higher degree of similarity and
the samples in different clusters are more different from
one another.
K-Means [19] algorithm is one of the most classical
clustering methods based on partition. The basic idea is
to cluster around K points as centers in space, by classi-
fying other samples which are the closest to them. The
values of each cluster center are updated iteratively until
the best clustering results are obtained. In application,
the clustering effect of K-Means algorithm is greatly in-
fluenced by the initial center selection method.
Considering the clustering performance can be im-
proved by using labeled samples to assist the initial cen-
ter selection, Wagstaff et al. [36] proposed the COP
K-Means algorithm. By constructing the two constraint
sets of Must-list and Cannot-link, the samples were con-
strained when they were added to clusters, but the selec-
tion of the initial center point was not constrained. Basu
et al. [7] proposed Seeded/Constrained K-Means algo-
rithm. It constrained the choices of initial center through
seed, and the constraint was also valid when a sample
was added into a cluster. However, in this method, each
cluster needs a pre-existing seed.
In the IP traceback process, it is possible to know
that some IP addresses belong to a certain organization.
However, it is very hard to know all the organizations
in advance. That means some cluster do not have pre-
existing seed. Therefore, we designed a Partial Seeded
K-Means algorithm to solve this problem.
Partial Seeded K-Means algorithm utilizes some sam-
ple subsets with known cluster partition (which is par-
tial seed) as seed, to determine the initial center point.
Considering there may be a variety of attack modes in
an organization, constraints on seed is not applied while
adding a sample into the clusters. That means the sam-
ples with known cluster partition may be classified into
the original cluster or a new cluster during the process of
clustering.
7
Algorithm 1: Partial Seeded K-Means
Input: Given a sample set D = {x1,x2, ...,xm}, the
clustering number k, the known clustering number
l, k ≤ l, the sample subset of known cluster
partitionD′ = {x1,x2, ...,xn}, and the sample subset
of unknown cluster partition D−D′.
1. Calculate the mean of the samples in each known
cluster Ci(1≤ i≤ l): µi = 1|ci| ∑x∈ci x.
2. Calculate the distance from each sample
x j(1≤ j ≤ m−n) in D−D′ to the known mean
µi(1≤ i≤ l), and choose the largest value which
equals mean distance added minimum distance as
the new initial mean µl+1and let µl+1 as known
mean.
3. Repeat step 2, until k− l samples are chosen as the
initial mean vector {µl+1,µl+2, ...,µl+k}, make
µi(i≤ i≤ l) and {µl+1,µl+2, ...,µl+k} to be the
initial mean vector with k means.
4. Calculate the distance di j =
∥∥x j−µi∥∥2 which is
from each sample x j(1≤ j ≤ m−n) in D−D′ to
each mean vector µi(1≤ i≤ k).
5. Choose the cluster label for the sample x j
according to nearest initial vector
λ j = argmini∈1,2,...,k−l d ji(1≤ j ≤ m−n), and add
x j into corresponding cluster Cλi =Cλi ∪
{
x j
}
.
6. Calculate new mean vector µ ′i =
1
|ci| ∑x∈ci x, if
µ ′i 6= µi and update µi to µ
′
i .
7. Repeat step 4,5,6, until no mean vector to update.
Output: Cluster partition C = {C1,C2, ...,Ck}
7 Evaluation
7.1 IP Recall Rate of the Known Organiza-
tions
We use the IP addresses of the four known organiza-
tions to check how many IP addresses of the same or-
ganizations are recalled in the same cluster. The four
curves from Figure 11 to Figure 14 show how the recall
rate varies with different K values. Apparently, the IP
addresses of Shodan, Censys and Beacon Labs are all
grouped into the same cluster, when the cluster number
K is set between 20 and 25. However, the highest re-
call rate of Ditecting’s IP addresses is about 40%. That
means Ditecting’s IP addresses are divided into different
clusters and there may be multiple attack modes in the
samples of Ditecting.
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Figure 11: The recall rate of Shodan’s IP addresses.
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Figure 12: The recall rate of Censys’ IP addresses.
7.2 Similarity Between the Predicted Value
and the True Value
Given the knowledge of the ground truth class assign-
ments labels true and our clustering algorithm assign-
ments of the same samples labels pred, Adjusted Rand
Index (ARI) [18] is a function that measures the sim-
ilarity of the two assignments, ignoring permutations
and with chance normalization. Mutual Information is
a function that measures the agreement of the two as-
signments, ignoring permutations. Adjusted Mutual In-
formation (AMI) is normalized against chance [35].
We use the 66 IP addresses of the known organizations
out of 573 valid IP addresses to compare the similarity
between the predicted value and the true value. Figure 15
shows how ARI and AMI scores between the predicted
and the true values of the 66 IP addresses vary with dif-
ferent K values. Apparently, the clustering works best
when the number of clusters K is set between 20 and 29.
7.3 Clustering Performance
In the previous sections, we have evaluated the cluster-
ing effect using the samples with known labels. If the
ground truth labels are unknown, evaluation must be per-
formed using the model itself. The Silhouette Coefficient
[29] is an example of such an evaluation, where a higher
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Figure 13: The recall rate of Ditecting’s IP addresses.
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Clusters
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
R
e
ca
ll 
R
a
te
 o
f 
B
e
a
co
n
 L
a
b
's
 I
P
 a
d
d
re
ss
e
s
Figure 14: The recall rate of Beacon Lab’s IP addresses.
Silhouette Coefficient score relates to a model with bet-
ter defined clusters. Calinski-Harabaz index [10] can be
used to evaluate the model too, where a higher Calinski-
Harabaz score relates to a model with better defined clus-
ters.
Figure 16 and Figure 17 respectively show the curves
of Silhouette Coefficient score and Calinski-Harabaz
score, when the number of clusters K is set differently.
Apparently, the clustering works best when K is set to
20.
7.4 Attack Pattern Recognition
Figure 18 shows the total number of clusters, in which
those IP addresses of the four known organizations are
grouped. No matter what value K is set, the maximum
number of clusters is always 6. It indicates that there
are only 6 attack patterns at the most in the samples with
known organization labels.
The attack pattern of Shodan, Censys, and Beacon Lab
is unique, when the cluster number K is set between
20 and 25. But Detecting’s attack mode is not unique.
All the IP addresses of Detecting belong to three dif-
ferent clusters, except that four IP addresses are labeled
as Shodan and two IP addresses are labeled as Censys.
The specific distribution of these IP addresses is shown
in Figure 19.
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Figure 15: ARI and AMI scores between the predicted
and the true values of the 66 IP addresses vary with dif-
ferent K values.
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Figure 16: Silhouette Coefficient score vary with differ-
ent K values.
7.5 Organization Identificaion
We set the cluster number K to be 20 for clustering and
get 20 clusters at last. That means we find 20 kinds of
attack patterns. However, these 20 attack patterns do
not indicate there are 20 organizations. Because an or-
ganization may have multiple attack patterns, and some
different organizations may also share a common attack
pattern. The DNS query results and the geographical lo-
cations of IP Addresses are helpful to identify the organi-
zations. If the IP addresses in a cluster point to the same
static domain name or they are very close geographically,
we can name this cluster with these labels.
As shown in Table 5, there are 20 clusters with no less
than 9 IP addresses in each of them. According to the
DNS query results, Some IP addresses in cluster 1, 2, 3
and 4 point to a static domain name, and some IP ad-
dresses in the clusters 11, 14, and 17 point to a dynamic
domain name. There is no domain name for reference in
clusters 15, 18, 19 and 20. However, they are located in
a particular country or a region, so we can name these
clusters with the geographical labels. Furthermore, the
cluster 3 and 13 are labeled as Ditecting, which confirms
9
Cluster IP Count Auxiliary Information Organization
1 93 22 IP are mapped to the domain name shodan.io Shodan
2 180 14 IP are mapped to the domain name eecs.umich.edu Censys
3 75 8 IP are mapped to the domain name neu.edu.cn Ditecting
4 43 5 IP are mapped to the domain name plcscan.org Beacon lab
11 51 26 IP are mapped to the dynamic domain name binaryedge.ninja binaryedge.ninja
13 11 4 IP are mapped to the domain name neu.edu.cn Ditecting
14 17 6 IP are mapped to the dynamic domain name amazonaws.com amazonaws.com
15 20 17 IP are located in China China Org
17 35 25 IP are mapped to the dynamic domain name members.linode.com linode.com
18 14 11 IP are located in China China Org
19 14 12 IP are located in Europe Europe Org
20 9 7 IP are located in China China Org
Table 5: Clusters and their labels of organization.
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Figure 17: Calinski-Harabaz score vary with different K
values.
the existence of multiple attack patterns in a single orga-
nization.
8 Related Work
8.1 ICS Intrusion Detection
Khalili and Sami [21] have proposed the SysDetect,
which is a Systematic approach to Critical State Deter-
mination, to solve the problem of determining the crit-
ical states in the state-based intrusion detection. This
system built a well-established and iterative data min-
ing algorithm, ie Apriori. Kwon et al. [24] have pro-
posed a novel behavior-based IDS for IEC 61850 pro-
tocol using both statistical analysis of traditional net-
work features and specification-based metrics. Yang et
al. [39] have presented a rule-based IDS for IEC 60870-
5-104 driven SCADA networks using an in-depth proto-
col analysis and a Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) method.
McParland et al. [25] have proposed the characteristic-
based intrusion detection, which is an extension of the
specification-based method, by defining a set of good
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Figure 18: The total number of clusters, in which
those IP addresses of the four known organizations are
grouped.
properties and looking for behavior outside those prop-
erties. A specification-based intrusion detection model
is designed to enhance the protection from both outside
attacks and inside mistakes through combining the com-
mand sequence with the physical device sensor data. Mo
et al. [26] have developed the model-based techniques
which is capable of detecting integrity attacks on the sen-
sors of a control system. It is assumed that the attacker
wishes to disrupt the operation of a control system in
steady state, to which end the attacker hijacks the sen-
sors, observes, and records their readings for a certain
amount of time, and repeats them afterward to camou-
flage his attack. The model-based techniques can effec-
tively prevent such attacks. Shang et al. [31] have pre-
sented PSO-SVM algorithm which optimizes parameters
by advanced Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) algo-
rithm. The method identifies anomalies of Modbus TCP
traffic according to appear frequencies of the mode short
sequence of Modbus function code sequence. Zhou et al.
[43] have designed a novel multimodel-based anomaly
intrusion detection system with embedded intelligence
10
Figure 19: Distribution of Detecting’s IP addresses.
and resilient coordination for the field control system in
industrial process automation. In this system, a multi-
model anomaly detection method is proposed, and a cor-
responding intelligent detection algorithm is designed.
In addition, in order to overcome the shortcomings of
anomaly detection, a classifier based on intelligent hid-
den Markov model is designed to distinguish the actual
attacks and failures.
8.2 IP Traceback
Savage et al. [30] have described a general purpose trace-
back mechanism based on probabilistic packet marking.
Routers probabilistically mark packets with partial path
information when they arrive. By combining a modest
number of such packets, a victim can reconstruct the en-
tire path. Snoeren et al. [32] have presented a hash-based
technique for IP traceback that generates audit trails for
traffic within the network, and can trace the origin of a
single IP packet delivered by the network in the recent
past. Belenky et al. [8] have proposed a Deterministic
Packet Marking algorithm, which only requires the bor-
der router to mark the 16-bits Packet ID field and the
reserved 1-bit Flag in the IP header. Therefore, the vic-
tim can obtain the corresponding entry address and the
subnet where the attack source is located. This method
is simple and efficient compared to Probabilistic Packet
Marking algorithm. Bellovin et al. [9] have proposed
an ICMP Traceback Message. When forwarding pack-
ets, routers can, with a low probability, generate a trace-
back message that is sent along to the destination or back
to the source. With enough traceback messages from
enough routers along the path, the traffic source and path
of forged packets can be determined. Goodrich et al. [17]
have presented a new approach to IP traceback based
on the probabilistic packet marking paradigm. This ap-
proach, which is called randomize-and-link, uses large
checksum cords to link message fragments in a way that
is highly scalable, for the cords serve both as associa-
tive addresses and data integrity verifiers. The main ad-
vantage of this approach is that attacker cannot fabri-
cate a message and it has good scalability. Gong et al.
[15, 16] have presented a novel hybrid IP traceback ap-
proach based on both packet logging and packet mark-
ing. They maintain the single packet traceback ability
of the hash-based approach and, at the same time, alle-
viate the storage overhead and access time requirement
for recording packet digests at routers. Their work im-
proves the practicability of single-packet IP traceback by
decreasing its overhead. Yang et al. [38] have proposed
a traceback scheme that marks routers interface numbers
and integrates packet logging with a hash table (RIHT) to
deal with the logging and marking issues in IP traceback.
RIHT has the properties of low storage, high efficiency,
zero false positive and zero false negative rates in attack-
path reconstruction. Yu et al. [40] have proposed a mark-
ing on demand (MOD) scheme based on the DPM mech-
anism to dynamically assign marking IDs to DDoS attack
related routers to perform the traceback task. They set up
a global mark distribution server (MOD server) and some
local DDoS attack detector. When there appears suspi-
cious network flows, the detector requests unique IDs
from the MOD server, and embeds the assigned unique
IDs to mark the suspicious flows. At the same time, the
MOD server deposits the IP address of the request router
and the assigned marks, which are used to identify the IP
addresses of the attack sources respectivelyinto its MOD
database. Fadel et al. [14] have presented a new hy-
brid IP traceback framework. This framework is based
on both marking and logging techniques. In the marking
algorithm, every router is assigned a 12-bits-length ID
number; it helps in deploying pushback method to per-
mit legitimate traffic flow smoothly. In the packet log-
ging technique, a logging ratio is managed by changing
a value k specified in the traceback system. This frame-
work can save more than 50% of the storage space of
routers. Cheng et al. [12] argue that cloud services offer
better options for the practical deployment of an IP trace-
back system. They have presented a novel cloud-based
traceback architecture, which possesses several favorable
properties encouraging ISPs to deploy traceback services
on their networks. This architecture includes a temporal
token-based authentication framework, called FACT, for
authenticating traceback service queries. Nur et al. [27]
exploit the record route feature of the IP protocol, and
propose a novel probabilistic packet marking scheme to
infer forward paths from attacker sites to a victim site and
enable the victim to delegate the defense to the upstream
Internet Service Providers (ISPs). Compared to the other
techniques, this approach requires less many packets to
construct the paths from attacker sites toward a victim
11
site.
9 Conclusions
IP traceback for cyber attacks usually needs redesigning
the Internet deploying new service. In this study, we have
proposed a malicious IP traceback model, i.e. ICSTrace,
for Industrial Control System without changing the Inter-
net infrastructure or deploying any new services. By an-
alyzing the characteristics of the attack data, we extract
the numeric features and the sequence transformation
features from the function codes and their parameters.
Those features are expressed by a one-dimensional vec-
tor, which stands for the unique pattern of an attack. As
a result, the problem of IP traceback turns into a problem
of clustering those patterns. We also propose a Partial
Seeded K-Means algorithm to cluster the IP addresses
with the same pattern into a malicious organization. The
effectiveness of ICSTrace is proved by experiments on
real attack data. Although ICSTrace can not recover the
whole path of the attack, it is significant in the following
aspects:
1. Find out the malicious IP addresses which belong to
the same organization.
2. Reveal the unexposed active IP addresses belonging
to the known organizations.
3. Collect the springboards used by the same organi-
zation for launching attacks.
4. Provide learning samples for subsequent malicious
behavior identification by expressing the attack pat-
tern in the form of feature vector.
10 Future work
In the future, we will improve ICSTrace and apply it to
other kinds of ICS protocols, even the traditional Internet
protocols. At the same time, we will use the attack pat-
terns as the learning samples to design and validate the
intrusion detection system based on machine learning, to
solve the difficult problem of unknown threat detection.
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